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LEVINAS, LAW SCHOOLS AND THE POOR:
THEY STAND OVER US

Marie A. Failinger*
They stand over us, hospitable and destitute.' The height of their
welcome and their need is infinite, and we are fearful.2 We are accused,
and justly SO.3 We are hostages to their immeasurable Otherness, and
that is our humanity, our reality.4 When we peer into these faces, we see
not our own reflections but an alienage that is inalienable. Much as we
try to wrest ourselves free of this demand, we cannot. Our thrashing
about simply enmeshes us further in the web in which they catch us, as
they demand of us a humanity that we have tried to leave behind. 5
Philosopher Emmanuel Levinas tells us that this is reality: we are
not, as we suppose, architects of a safe and livable world, not consumers
of a life that we can select off a shelf. In fact, we are hostages of the
Other standing over us. 6 His immense need demands our complete
surrender, our ultimate sacrifice.7 This is reality. It is not legal ethics, as
* Marie A. Failinger, Associate Dean, Hamline University School of Law. This
paper was given at a 2008 conference at Valparaiso University School of Law.

1. See

EMMANUEL LEVINAS, TOTALITY AND INFINITY:

AN ESSAY ON EXTERIORITY

197, 199-200 (Alphonso Lingis trans., Duquesne Univ. Press 1969) (1961) [hereinafter
TOTALITY AND ININITY] (describing the "welcome of the face" as an ethical structure and
arguing that the infinite other "from the depths of defen[s~eless eyes rises firm and
absolute in its nudity and destitution").
2. Id at 200 (describing the simultaneous destitution and height of the other person).
3. See Emmanuel Levinas, Substitution, in BASIC PHILOSOPHICAL WRITINGS 88
(Adriaan T. Peperzak et al. eds., 1996) (describing the accusation of the self as
responsible for others and what they do) [hereinafter Substitution].
4. See id. at 91, 118 (describing the ego as a hostage for others that permits
compassion for and relationship with them).
5. See, e.g., id. at 95 (describing "the impossibility of evading the neighbor's call ...
the impossibility of distancing ourselves").
6. Id at 118 (describing how the self is provoked into responsibility against his will
by substitution as a hostage).
7. See TOTALITY AND INFINITY, supra note 1, at 200 (describing how the Other
imposes himself by the appeal of his destitution).
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we claim to our students, as if they could reason out a relationship with
these Others from a text, an abstraction, a rule, or an American Bar
Association pronouncement. Instead, it is the reality that precedes our
first moment of consciousness, our first moment of being and of
reasoning, our first moment of reacting to our world.8
Levinas warns us how we deny this reality by assuring ourselves that
we can totalize the Other. 9 Whether we represent him or oppose him, we
shrink the immense Otherness of the Indigent into a doll-like miniature
within our consciousness. Or we reconstruct the complex nuance of the
Face into a few lines of caricature that fits our preconceptions of who the
poor must be, in order to be poor.1 0 In case conferences and among
ourselves in law classrooms, we talk as if we might package "our" poor
person into a neat white box-the good, but unfortunate woman, down
on her luck, battered by others' perfidy-so we can deliver her, giftwrapped, shiny, and virtuous to those who would expose and defeat her:
the judge and the executioner, the welfare worker, and the radio talk
show host excoriating her need. We teach our students that their
objective should be to use their lawyering skills to present her as
presentable to those who will decide her fate. We encourage them to
suppress that irrepressible roughness and brokenness, that uncooperative
or passive surprise that makes fitting her into our gift-wrap very difficult
indeed.
With Levinas' reminder, we can identify our fear and our anger at
our helplessness before our client's Need. We can acknowledge how we
make a circus of the relationship with the Indigent Other whose Face
keeps demanding the justice that we want to give and yet deny. We can
confess how we take to the trapeze of legal professionalism: how in our
own minds we flip ourselves upside down so that we can believe that we
look down into the face of the Other instead of up into its reproach.
Heeding his prophesy, we can acknowledge how we are willing to vault
into the unknown: demanding true justice for the poor, the justice that
8. Levinas describes the moment when we see ourselves and others in relationship
with the Face, in which decisions about what is due each person must be made, as the
"birth of thought, of consciousness, of justice, and of philosophy." Substitution, supra
note 3, at 95.
9. See TOTALITY AND INFINITY, supra note 1, at 198 (describing the attempt to
"'murder" the difference of the Other); see also Adriaan T. Peperzak, Preface to BASIC
PHILOSOPHICAL WRITINGS, supra note 3, at x (describing how the ego inhabits the world
by attempting to totalize it, even though the Other remains "ungraspable or
incomprehensible").
10. TOTALITY AND INFINITY, supra note 1, at 198.
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can only come if we move well beyond the legal resolution of the case.
But we impose a condition on pushing off from our platforms: we will
make the attempt only if the net of respectability secures us below, only
if the invisible guidewire of our peers' approval is sure to catch us before
we plunge into the darkness with our clients. We can acknowledge, too,
how, as lawyers, we dress up the Other in the costume we have selected
for her, paint a smile on her face, or a tear, anything to make the tragedy
or joy of her life seem artificial, removed and thus not demanding our
whole lives.
We must confess, too, how we attempt the "murder" of so many
Others'" by pressing the welcome and urging of their Faces flat onto the
map of the world. We can make the poor as nondemanding as those
colorful countries spread thin on our table. We can rest smug in the
assurance that they are not ours to worry about because their place on the
map is not ours-they are not suffering or dying in the United States, not
here in this state, not here in this city, and not on this street. They are not
in our chez soi, our place at home."2 In our anxiety to try to deny reality,
we can and do try to convince ourselves that others will now be
responsible, that it is only our job to take our clients "through the
system," that it is only our job to teach our students how to play the
lawyer game, and no more. But the Face breaks into our moment of
satisfaction, the moment when we are convinced that we have alleviated
our responsibility. She demands our community and our courage in the
midst of her nudity, her need.
How have we as lawyers, students, and teachers of the law come to
this pass? First, consider the demands of our own discipline. The law
itself is an exercise in containment, in finding a way to comprehend and
limit incomprehensible suffering and oppression. Indeed, it is especially
when the oppressed stand over oppression in their majestic power that
the law, in its anxiety, must suppress. I offer just two brief examples.
First, remember how quickly the courts fell to reading the law to
suppress the American civil rights movement as it gained momentum in
affirmative-action and desegregation cases. Even though 250 years
11. Levinas describes our response to the Other as an attempt, in violence, to grasp
and possess him within our own understanding, an attempt that tries to negate him,
though the Other always eludes us. Emmanuel Levinas, Is Ontology Fundamental?, in
BASIC PHILOSOPHICAL WRITINGS, supra note 3, at 9.
12. In Levinas' view, I resist the demand of the other by "sojourning, [by] identifying
[myself] by existing here at home with [myself]" at a site where I can be free of the

Other, where I can possess everything.

TOTALITY AND INFINITY,

supra note 1, at 37.
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4
separate Jamestown's slave trade'13 and the Fourteenth Amendment,'1
barely twenty years separate the mountain high of Brown v. Board of
Education,'" which essentially proclaimed that we are bonded to and
responsible for the opportunity and dignity of the Other,'16 and the
beginning of its suppression: Milliken v. Bradley, decided in 1974, found
that we in the suburbs were not constitutionally responsible for what
happens in our cities.'17 Regents of the University of California v. Bakke,
decided in 1978, found that we in higher education are not
constitutionally responsible for the state of our public schools.'" In City
of Richmond v. JA. Croson Co., decided in 1989, and Adarand
Constructors,Inc. v. Pena, decided in 1995, the Court found that we as a
community are not constitutionally responsible for what our fathers and
their fathers before them did to deny opportunities to minority
contractors and construction workers.'19
Or consider the "right to welfare" cases-from Griffin v. Illinois's

13. See Jonathan A. Bush, The First Slave (and Why He Matters), 18 CARDOZO L.
REv. 599, 601-02 (1996) (placing the first African slave in the colonies in 1616 or
before).
14. See Hurd v. Hodge, 334 U.S. 24, 32 & n.111(1948) (describing the joint resolution
which became the Fourteenth Amendment as passing in Congress on June 13, 1866).
15. Brown v. Bd. of Educ., 347 U.S. 483 (1954).
16. See id at 493 (noting that "education is perhaps the most important function of
state and local governments" and that "[sluch an opportunity, where the state has
undertaken to provide it, is a right which must be made available to all on equal terms").
17. Milliken v. Bradley, 418 U.S. 717, 757 (1974) (holding that absent intentional
official segregation of Detroit's schools from its suburbs, which was necessary to
constitute a constitutional violation, no interdistrict desegregation remedy was permitted
since such a remedy would go "beyond the governing equitable principles established in
this Court's decisions").
18. Regents of the Univ. of Cal. v. Bakke, 438 U.S. 265, 297 n.36, 307 (1978)
(rejecting racially based affirmative-action programs aimed at remedying the effects of
societal discrimination though "[n]o one denies the regrettable fact that there has been
societal discrimination in this country against various racial and ethnic groups").
19. City of Richmond v. J.A. Croson Co., 488 U.S. 469, 498-99 (1989) (holding that
"a generalized assertion that there has been past discrimination in an entire industry
provides no guidance for a legislative body to determine the precise scope of the injury it
seeks to remedy" despite evidence of such societal discrimination and "the sorry history
of both private and public discrimination in this country [that] has contributed to a lack of
opportunities for black entrepreneurs"); Adarand Constructors, Inc. v. Pena, 515 U.S.
200, 220 (1995) (noting that ...[s~ocietal discrimination, without more, is too amorphous
a basis for imposing a racially classified remedy"'. (quoting Wygant v. Jackson Bd. of
In Adarand Constructors, affirmative-action
Educ., 476 U.S. 267, 276 (1986))).
programs for minority contractors were required to surmount the strict-scrutiny standard
despite "[tlhe unhappy persistence of both the practice and the lingering effects of racial
"Id. at 236-37.
discrimination against minority groups in this country ..
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and Douglas v. California's stirring pronouncement that we are all
responsible for the equality of justice, 0 to Lindsey v. Norm et's
constitutional distancing of the body politic from the call of the poor for
a roof over their heads 2 -a moment of hope that lasted not even sixteen
years.
The law's categories impose a security that, much of the time,
merely suppresses conflict and does not heal it. Its rules and its
procedures are the absolutes of victory or defeat-not understanding, not
pleasure, not amazement at the very difference of the Other, but
surrender or imposition. Robert Cover reminded us of this violence of
the law repeatedly, perhaps most clearly in Nomos and Narrative:
[T]he jurisgenerative principle by which legal meaning
proliferates in all communities never exists in isolation from
violence. Interpretation always takes place in the shadow of
coercion. . . . Courts, at least the courts of the state, are
characteristically "jurispathic."
[They are needed] to suppress law, to choose between two or
more laws, to impose upon laws a hierarchy.2
And yet, faced with the reality that our law suppresses law, that it
destroys the call of the poor, we plaintively ask, who can live with no
order?
But just as we are recognizing the violence of the law, we must also
consider who we lawyers, law students, and law professors really are,
down deep. Many scholars have tried to tell us that law school, like a
20. See Griffin v. Illinois, 351 U.S. 12, 17 (1956). The Court found that a state could
not deny an appellate transcript to an indigent criminal, and noted "the central aim of our
entire judicial system-all people charged with crime must, so far as the law is
concerned, 'stand on an equality before the bar of justice in every American court."' Id.
(quoting Chambers v. Florida, 309 U.S. 227, 241 (1940)); Douglas v. California, 372
U.S. 353, 357 n.2 (1963). "'When society acts to deprive one of its members of his life,
liberty or property, it takes its most awesome steps.. .. The methods we employ in the
enforcement of our criminal law have aptly been called the measures by which the quality
of our civilization may be judged."' Id. (quoting Coppedge v. United States, 369 U.S.
438, 449 (1962)).
21. Lindsey v. Normet, 405 U.S. 56, 74 (1972) (noting that "the Constitution does not
provide judicial remedies for every social and economic ill" and that there was no
"constitutional guarantee of access to dwellings of a particular quality" or "the assurance
of adequate housing").
22. Robert M. Cover, The Supreme Court, 1982 Term-Foreword. Nomos and
Narrative,97 HARv. L. Rnv. 4, 40 (1983).

120

120

~Oklahoma
City University Law Review

[o.335
[Vol.

meat grinder, crushes the social imagination of our students, their passion
23
for the good, their enthusiasm for justice. Roger Cramnton was among
the first, but has not been the last, to describe what law school "does to"
us. He identified
[tihe essential ingredients of the ordinary religion of [our
classrooms as] a skeptical attitude toward generalizations; an
instrumental approach to law and lawyering; a "tough-minded"
and analytical attitude toward legal tasks and -professional roles;
and a faith that man, by the application of his reason and the use
of democratic processes, can make the world a better place.2
We come out of law school, he claims, with a stock-in-trade that defies
the immense demands which, in the very living out of their differences,
the Others place upon us. 25 We live out the values of "moral relativism
tending toward nihilism, a pragmatism tending toward an amoral
instrumentalism, a realism tending toward cynicism, an individualism
tending toward atomism, and a faith in reason and democratic processes
26
tending toward mere credulity and idolatry."1
Even granting Professor Cramton the symptoms he noted, their
etiology is not quite so clear. Look at those of us who become lawyers.
How we love our order. How we love to straighten out, to make right, an
unruly world, even before law school "calls us out" to live in this kind of
imagination. From the very first, when our family and friends begin to
23. See, e.g., Kirsten Edwards, Found! The Lost Lawyer, 70 FORDHAm L. REv. 37, 69
(2001) (quoting several authors as arguing that "elite law schools have been perceived as
destroying the humanity of students"); Peter L. Davis, Why Not a Justice School? On the
Role of Justice in Legal Education and the Construction of a Pedagogy of Justice, 30
HAMLINE L. REX'. 513, 519 (2007) (noting: "[L]aw school has made almost a fetish of
discouraging exploration of morality, fairness, and justice.. .. Currently, our emphasis
on process in our teaching constitutes a form of reductionism. This reductionism sorts
out such values as fairness and justice, which are rejected as "soft" and "fuzzy,"
unbefitting law school classroom discussion."); Lauren Carasik, Justice in the Balance:
An Evaluation of One Clinic's Ability to Harmonize Teaching PracticalSkills, Ethics and

Professionalism with a Social Justice Mission, 16 S. CAL.

REV. L. & SOC. JUST.

23, 40

(2006) (noting that students enter "brimming with optimism and energy to engage in
public interest work . .. [and] altruistic goals and idealistic visions of the law . . . [but]
embark on their careers having forsaken their idealism and commitment to social justice
issues").
24. Roger C. Cramton, The Ordinary Religion of the Law School Classroom, 29 J.
LEGAL EDUC. 247, 248 (1978).
25. See idat262.
26. Id.
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tell us who we are, to reflect how we interact with them and our world,
they might as well say, "How you love order more than any other thing.";
And in our very souls, from the very day that we draw breath, what we
lawyers love about the law is the way it portrays the immensity of the
Other as chaos to be ordered, sequenced, and completed.
Those of us who teach in the academy see it in the neat, uncluttered
lives that many of our students present in the pages of their applications:
no tragedies, no coloring outside the lines, no hint of failure. Indeed,
those who serve on the admissions committee, and certainly those at elite
law schools, cherish "top" students' penchant for order, reflected in
consistently outstanding grades over time, in a matching Law School
Admission Test ("LSAT"), and in useful but "safe" community service
work.2
No "Stop Huntingdon Animal Cruelty" members or other
convicted animal-rescue terrorists need app ly. 28 No "Earth Liberation
Front" lawyers, thank you very much.2 Our students and alumni are
steadfastly loyal to the discipline of creating and maintaining order in the
universe: their passion is reflected when they talk about why they came
to law school, rehearsing their plans for a comfortable life, their hopes of
making the world a safer place, and their pride in being a steady anchor
in their communities.
In the thick of law school, we law professors see also a side of this
passion for order that is not so irenic, not so world-maintaining. We see
this attachment to the certain and the known in the way our students
respond, in anger and despair, to our refusal to give them rules and

27. See Lawrence S. Krieger, Human Nature As a New Guiding Philosophyfor Legal
Education and the Profession, 47 WASHBURN L.J. 247, 274-75 (2008) (noting that an
Association of American Law Schools president had asked "law schools to 'do the right
thing"'. and not engage in hypocritical practices such as "skimming students with
attractive numbers from other schools through targeted admission or transfer practices;
manipulating statistics reported to the ranking organization ... )
28. Mary Ann Liebert, Animal Activists Sentenced to Prison, 25 BIOTECHNOLOGY L.
REP. 677 (2006) (describing convictions of Stop Huntingdon Animal Cruelty advocates
for web-based harassment of Huntingdon Life Sciences employees for testing drugs and
household chemicals on animals. One convicted activist cried after she was sentenced
because "she had wanted to go to law school but would not be admitted in the wake of
the felony conviction.").
29. Joshua K. Marquis & Danielle M. Weiss, Eco-Terror: Special Interest Terrorism,
39 PROSECUTOR 30, 30, 32 (2005) (describing the Earth Liberation Front's ("ELF")
mission to inflict economic damage on those exploiting the earth and noting that ELF
"appears to be an intellectual, cunning and dangerous single-issue terrorist group made
up of autonomous cells that should . . . be continuously monitored and their attacks
investigated").
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answers in our classes. We see it when they respond to human context
and suffering as a nasty complexity that prevents them from
understanding a case or succeeding in law school. We hear it in the
cynicism they express about whether "it depends" can be a faithful
answer to a legal question. We see it in the diminishment and
disempowerment they experience when they get their first exam grades,
when they realize that their hard work and exacting memorization has
not yielded them mastery of their craft or the approval of their masters.
So, rather than simply excoriating law school for robbing the
innocence of our students, we might imagine that all of us gathered in the
law-school community are really nothing more than security addicts in
the twelve-step program that is real life. Much as we might SAY that, as
we write our articles, we are not vying for the "most promising proposal
to create order out of chaos" (especially in First Amendment doctrine, I
should say as a constitutional lawyer), we are. We want to believe that
we are open to the chaos the Indigent lugs with her like mismatched
luggage, that Other who appears suddenly to demand justice from the
legal system. Yet, we hold our arm out to stop her from coming too
close, from overpowering us with her Need; we retreat into the office,
desperately needing to be with others who understand and prize our
addiction to orderliness.
Indeed, we love the neat rhythm of fourteen week class endings, of
trials with final statements and jury verdicts, of deals and corporations
that can be sealed within the four corners of a piece of legal paper. We
love the way that jurisdiction suppresses the messiness of injustice, the
way the elements of a cause of action stifle reality so that it can fit inside
the four comners of the box we construct, the box that is law. We enter
law school for its order. We thrive because law school allows us to be
perfected in the techniques of suppressing human disorder. We practice
law in the comfortable company of others who share our obsession. And
yet, we find that our life in the law is not orderly, not nearly as orderly as
we hope or expect.
To be perfectly fair, lawyers are at one and the same time realists;
there is an ambivalence to the way in which we court order. Most of us,
at least unconsciously, are somewhat attracted to the creativity, the
novelty inherent in the disorder of the real world. We see and are
entranced by the Other pulling us forward into her need, even as we
resist being drawn into her magnetic demands. In a moment of
weakness, we can briefly acknowledge our desire for the Other's need.
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We recognize it in the satisfaction of a just judicial decision, or a case
well-tried for our clients. We accept that disorder when we come out to
play with open-textured constitutions and four-factor tests.
We
recognize and thrive in it as we continuously re-open once-closed
discussions about the law, the essence of common-law adjudication.
But by the end of the class hour, or the case, our desire for order the
law is expected to give is stronger; we cling to the concrete expressions
and stone-like principles that overtake these playful moods, these
attractions.
At the end of the law-school day, after we have
experimented with argument, policy, and values, the seething question or
the plaintive voice will rise: "tell me the black-letter law that you have
been hiding from me." At the end of the day, after we enact the drama of
litigation, we demand of the judge on behalf of our clients: "give me a
clear verdict, a clear victory, or, if you must, a clear loss. Let it be the
end for my client and for me, the end of our needing to deal with this
disrupter, this other party." As a man recoils from a woman he thinks
has overpowered him in her seduction, we withdraw from the
complications that the Face of the Other presents to our ordering, our
finding an ending.
We see that ambivalence, indeed, in Cramton's litany-we are as
30
much skeptical about reduction, about generalization, as we embrace it.
We temper our attraction to open-endedness, our very unbuttoned-down
faith in progress and in democracy with the life-defeating (because
reductive) process of analysis. We are, at once, instrumental: we are
doers in the world, and yet its naysayers, skeptics about the possibility of
rapprochement between us and the Other, between one client and his
adversary.
To say that we lawyers are naturally compulsive in our attraction to
order is not to absolve law schools themselves from complicity in
feeding our addictions. As with all of our experiences in the law, law
school creates its own unique geographies of order that are both shaped
by and shape the law student and lawyer's anxieties.
The first of these maps is the physical geography of the law school
building itself, announcing the separateness of our class. One has only to
see the bewilderment of an indigent client trying to find the clinic in
many a law school to understand how we construct our order to subvert
the need and the height of the One standing over us. The bricks and

30. Cramton, supra note 24, at 248.
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mortar of some law schools, designed like an august temple for a
vengeful God, are themselves imposing. But we go further: we mimic
the segregationist architecture of the Old South, designating clinic
entrances that are located off some back or side entrance, or in some far
away corridor.' We require that our clients buzz themselves into the
building or show a pass to armed guards, to demonstrate that they have
been selected to be welcome. Are you a member of the fraternity? Do
you know the secret handshake?
Or conversely, we may not mark our clients' way to the clinic at all.
We thereby signal that the poor are beyond our sight; we put them in
their place by our oversight. We allow clients to wander, like strangers
in grungy coats in a small town, avoiding the greeting glances of
suspicion and hostility from students and staff (what are they stealing?).
These messages-we exclude you unless we have selected you, or we do
not bother to recognize that you are coming-diminish the command of
their Need just as surely as a bar on the door.
Or sometimes our law schools use the geography of place to isolate
the poor like a disease that needs to be quarantined: we push the clinic
off onto an unused building on campus, or a far-off part of town. The
Property class will not be held where the clients come. The student
lounge will not be adjoined to suffering.
Or we simply refuse to venture into the worlds that our clients
inhabit: the law school is a place where we shelter young, vital
intellectuals; no others need apply. Steven Berenson notes how our
students, in particular, "inhabit very different physical and social realms"
than our senior citizens, and how their distance operates to screen seniors
from our view.3 We do not often send our students out to the elderly, as
if they were bringing justice like Meals on Wheels. Too often, our
students are more comfortable talking with prisoner clients by phone or
e-mail than entering the barred doors behind which those clients live.
We see this love of security, too, in the micro-geography that

31. See, e.g., Marjorie Anne McDiarmid, What's Going on Down There in the
Basement: In-House Clinics Expand Their Beachhead, 35 N.Y.L. SCH. L. REv. 239, 264
(1990) (describing frequent placement of clinics in law school basements and other outof-the-way places); Paula Gaber, "Just Trying to be Human in This Place: " The Legal
Education of Twenty Women, 10 YALE J.L. & FEMINISM 165, 211 (1998) (noting physical
segregation and lesser status of clinical faculty at Yale).
32. Steven Keith Berenson, Can We Talk?: Impediments to Intergenerational
Communication and Practice in Law School Elder Law Clinics, 6 ELDER L.J. 185, 194
(1998).
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students and lawyers sometimes create to hold their clients off. Who has
not read the advice to student lawyers that they should not sit behind a
33
desk, imposing a physical barrier between themselves and the client?
Paul Tremblay notes how such advice, amended by the admonition that
"'five and one-half feet is the preferred distance between people,"'
reflects "[tlhe academy's dominant culture training [that establishes]..
certain relatively reflexive feelings about social distance, [upon which
you, the student lawyer, would rely] in deciding how close to your client
34
you will sit, how you might arrange your furniture, and so forth."
While Tremblay emphasizes how a well-meaning student may try to
follow the norms of the client's culture on these matters, he implies that,
too often, even attentiveness may reflect stereotyping," i.e., a way for
lawyers and law students to impose their order in a situation of
uncertainty. Tremblay asks us to admit that we impose these rules
because of our fear of the ethical Height of the Other over us, and our
attempt to bring our indigent clients "down to size."
What is at stake for us, in terms of our own security, can be
illustrated by the reaction of law students at a Southern school where the
law library was adjacent to a hallway open to members of the public.
The students did not like it that members of the public could look at them
through the windows while they studied. They were so flummoxed at
the experience of being stared at by strangers, at being viewed rather
than being the voyeurs of others in the public world, that their dean had
blinds placed upon the windows, so no one could look in.3
Law school also reinforces a secure geography of thought upon

33. Paul R. Tremblay, Interviewing and Counseling Across Cultures: Heuristics and
Biases, 9 CLINICAL L. REv. 373, 389 (2002) (noting that one interviewing and counseling
text suggests "that lawyers [h]ave an area of your office which is conducive to personal
conversation rather than attempting to communicate across a large and often messy
desk," while another suggests "reduc[ing] the psychological barriers between lawyer and
client by meeting face-to-face rather than across a desk").

34. Id. at 389-90 (quoting THOMAS L. SHAFFER & JAMES R. ELKINS, LEGAL
INTERVIEWING AND COUNSELING IN ANUTSHELL 225 (3d ed. 1997)).
35. Id. at 388. Tremblay notes:
When you meet with a client from a different culture ...
[y]ou can rely on
some generalizations (the heuristic) about how your client will react to social
distance.. .. Of course, your own social background and cultural influences
cannot be ignored either, so you will search for a setting that accommodates the
(possibly) different preferences of your client with your own comfort levels.
Id. at 390.
36. This story was related with a request for anonymity as to its source.
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minds eager to embrace it. Turning to food to describe how his legal
research students imposed order upon the reality of complex cases,
Michael Jordan noted:
[the s]tudents seemed to approach cases with a set of stock
answers which they assumed would address most, if not all,
issues presented in the case. . . . Essentially, the case was
viewed as a lifeless mass ("dough") that could-should-be
forced into [a cookie cutter composed of their] previously
acquired knowledge molds that imposed a limited set of forms
on the case. The mold literally made the case. If the issues
could not be forced into the mold then there was something
wrong with the client, facts, law or whatever. Certainly it was
not the mold. Knowledge of the molds and the ability to force
the dough into the mold was viewed by the student as persuasive
evidence that he was thinking like a lawyer.3
Indeed, he reports, even such a potentially creative and open-ended
task as legal research became trapped in the students' anxious search for
the certainty they believed could be found in their lawyering role.3
Responding to their plea to get them "'started in the right direction,"' he
met their more and more pressing questions until:
it became clear that the operating premise of the student was that
I really knew the "right answer" and the assignment was nothing
more than a test to determine if he could find the answer in as
few steps as possible.
This process bore a striking resemblance to a popular
television game show, "Wheel Of Fortune." Like the contestant,
the student could win the game by determining what the right
answer was, with as little assistance or prompting as possible.
Presumably the prize was recognition that he was "thinking
like," or "acting like," a lawyer by quickly discovering the
correct answer.3

37. Michael Jordan, Law Teachers and the Educational Continuum, 5 S. CAL.
INTERDisc. L.J. 41, 43 (1996).

38. Id. at 44.
39. Id. (footnote omitted).
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Professor Jordan attributes this anxiety to law school, to students'
attempt to apply the Socratic method to their first real experience with
the law.4 Indeed, such anxiety is so palpable and the belief in certainty
so real, when he terminated one of these fishing expeditions by saying he
"neither knew the right question nor the right answer [and] [t]he student
did not believe [him] !"~'
At best, in law school, we do not do enough to contest the way in
which our students attempt to map order onto the messy world of conflict
that stands in challenge to them. At worst, Professor Jordan perhaps
rightly accuses us of encouraging students to draw the easy lines around
human conflicts to make them fit the categories we have so willingly
embraced.
A third geography we use to make order is the one by which we
chart our relations with others, particularly with clients. In our classes,
Professor Shalleck notes'
Within legal education, clients are paradoxical figures.
Although they are mostly absent from classroom discussions,
devoid of lives or places in the world, they can suddenly emerge,
as if from nowhere, with clear identities and characteristics, to
fill critical gaps in the classroom discussion. The clients who
make these sudden appearances are seemingly unproblematic
figures. Professors and students easily presume agreement as to
who they are and what they want. Within the legal system, all
seek wealth and freedom.4
And yet, the poor call us out, they call us to reality. They are the
disrupters; of our solitude, our at-homeness. Professor Shalleck described
the ones who are not present in the way we conduct the daily business of
the law school:
The clients who are missing from legal education are clients with
particular identities who are situated in distinctive ways within
the social world, facing often critical choices about their
participation in the legal world. Defying the presumptions of the

40. Id.
4 1. Id. at 45.
42. Ann Shalleck, Constructions of the Client Within Legal Education, 45 STAN. L.
Rrv. 1731, 1731 (1993).
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professor and students, these absent clients may have not only
their own understanding of what they want from involvement in
the legal system, but also their own visions of the legal order and
social and political life. They are, however, banished from the
classroom, forced out by the presumptive clients who serve as an
invisible but necessary pillar of the legal discourse of the
classroom, made to supply in unobtrusive and unproblematic
form the ends that the law and the legal system are working to
achieve.4
As Levinas would tell us, the Face tells its own story, makes its own
demand. And yet, we see no Face when we are talking about Williams v.

Walker-Thomas FurnitureCo.44 or Shapiro v. Thompson.45 Their stories
are not before our students, nor are the stories of other poor clients,
except for the compressed hypotheticals we offer our students, bleaching
out the pain and the joy of their daily lives. We do not invite poor clients
in to discuss how the legal doctrines that students are learning have made
an impact on their ability to get reasonable credit, to vote, or to seek
justice with the help of an appointed lawyer. We do not ask them how
wide the gap between their lives and justice remains, despite these legal
rules. We do not invite them either in the flesh, or by proxy, through
videos and photos, through narrative or poetry. We do not ask our
students if they have read The Grapes of Wrath4 6 when they are studying
43. Id.
44. Williams v. Walker-Thomas Furniture Co., 350 F.2d 445, 450 (D.C. Cir. 1965)
(holding that a court could refuse to enforce an unconscionable furniture contract). What
we learn about Ms. Williams from the case is that "the stereo contract listed the name of
appellant's social worker and her $218 monthly stipend from the government" and that
"with full knowledge that appellant had to feed, clothe and support both herself and seven
children on this amount, appellee sold her a $514 stereo set." Id. at 448. Eben Colby has
followed the effect of this case on the furniture company, noting that the company
continued aggressive collection against poor customers even after the decision. Eben
Colby, Note, What Did the Doctrine of Unconscionability Do to the Walker-Thomas
Furniture Company?, 34 CONN. L. REv. 625, 658-59 (2002).
45. Shapiro v. Thompson, 394 U.S. 618, 623-25 (1969), overruled by Edelman v.
Jordan, 415 U.S. 651 (1974). Professor Lynne Henderson described how the plaintiffs'
second set of lawyers were able to obviate justices' stereotypes and evoke their empathy
by telling the plaintiffs' stories. Lynne N. Henderson, Legality and Empathy, 85 MICH.
L. REv. 1574, 1610-20 (1987). And yet, viewing the opinion, these stories that
apparently touched the majority of justices were still a truncated expression of how the
states' welfare rules affected these plaintiffs. Id
46. For a synopsis of JOHN STEINBECK, THE GRAPES OF WRATH (Viking Press 1967)
(1939), see Edstephan.org, Steinbeck: Book Blurb-Penguin 1976, http://edstephan.org/
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the commerce clause, or Jody Raphael's Saving Bernice when they are
thinking about domestic violence in Family Law.4 We do not ask them
if they know the life of a child carpet weaver in India when they study
Children's Rights, or why so many women die in childbirth when we
tackle reproductive rights. Indeed, how many times have we seen their
classmates silently mock them when our students try to tell such a story;
somehow, we have taught them that this is "not the law," it is an
irrelevance.
It is not simply that we bar the real poor from the cases in the
classroom. In fact, other than the clinics, we bar them altogether from
the life of the law school. In our mock trial simulations, meant to
simulate reality, we most often choose as clients and witnesses not those
who have indeed suffered the injustice we are simulating, but law
students pretending to be clients. Law students are manageable; they can
learn their lines and behave in the scripted ways. In seeking witnesses,
we do not go out into the welfare offices and streets and say, "come,
teach us how you really live, testify to us about your life." In Counseling
and Negotiation classes, we rarely send our students out to a Legal Aid
office or a welfare line. We may not even send them to the clinic to see
whether they actually can learn the story of a poor person, much less
begin to grasp the complex way law informs their lives. Yet it is hard to
see, without such experiences, how they can become adept at counseling
the client about what the law can and cannot be made to give, or
bargaining with another for a just result.
The thought that the poor might be our partners in shaping our
mission and programs seems unimaginable in most law schools. They do
not sit on our Boards of Directors, our Dean's Advisory Councils.
Rarely do we see a law-school sponsored conference or program invite a
poor person to tell his story, or give his views about the topic at hand,
ironically, even when the program is on the very stuff of his life such as
public benefits programs or homelessness. When we send out our
brochures, they do not go to welfare or Social Security offices; we do not
invite the poor to join us to debate the merits of the laws that compress
their lives.
Steinbecklgrapes.htmil (last visited Dec. 18, 2009) (describing the travels of the Joads
from their lost tenant farm in Oklahoma to California).

47. For a synopsis Of JODY RAPHAEL, SAVING BERNICE: BATTERED WOMEN,
WELFARE, AND POVERTY (2000), see Northeastern University Press, SAVING BERNICE,
http://www.upne.com/1-55553-439-2.html (last visited Dec. 18, 2009) (noting the book's
description of "Bernice's ordeals at the hands of her abusive partner").
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Nor, when we are discussing how the law school might be more
effective in its outreach or service to the community, do we ask the poor
to come around the table to talk with us about what differences our
community service might make in their lives. They do not serve on our
task forces or our self-study committees. Whether we do not invite them
because we do not see their faces, because they have become invisible to
us, is unclear. Whether we do not invite them because we in the
academy have come to think we are looking down on the poor and they
have nothing to teach us-there is that upside down on the trapeze
again-remains a challenge to us. It may well be that we do not invite
them because we fear that we might, indeed, be captured by their need
and their vulnerability, that our students may lose sight of the paying
clients who can give them jobs.
Yet, the Face will not be diminished, even when we diminish it. The
Face shows itself before us, even when we are not paying attention. We
can, however, make a new beginning for ourselves. We can turn toward
the Face. The turn toward the Face is not just a hospitable act on our
part. It is an act by which we receive the hospitality of the poor, the
welcome of their unpredictability, their irrepressibility. It is an invitation
to behold reality and to engage the rushing and vibrant waters of the
human spirit, as much as it is a command. For our own part, we have
only to turn our faces to look.
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